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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 15915

KENNETH SHARP ,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a criminal proceeding in which the
appellant was charged and convicted of Burglary in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1953 as amended), a Second Degree Felony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted of the crime of Burglary as
defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1), a Second Degree Felony.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and sentence
imposed by the lower court.

Appellant further seeks the case to

be remanded for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 22, 1977, a Complaint was issued by the Justice
of the Peace, Stanley Leavitt, the Justice Court, Kamas Precinct,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Summit County, State of Utah.

The Complaint charged the appellant,

Kenneth V. Sharp, with the crime of Burglary, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1953 as amended) (R. 1).

After a prelimina:

hearing the appellant was charged by an Information filed on Januar;
5, 1978, alleging the aforementioned offense in the Third Judicial
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah (R. 4).
On April 6, 1978, a trial was held before the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge presiding.

The appellant made an

intelligent waiver of the jury and the case was heard before Judge
Hanson, Jr. as the trier of the fact (R. 36).

The appellant was

found guilty as charged in the Information on April 6, 1978.

The

appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one to
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
At the trial the State called Mr. Kenneth Rogerson, a
security guard for Pines Ranch (R. 38).

Mr. Rogerson testified

he observed the appellant and another person leaving the Pines
Ranch area.

Mr. Rogerson told the two people to leave the Ranch,

which they did (R. 44).

Mr. Rogerson then continued and inspected the area. He
observed the Cornwall cabin, the cabin alleged in the Information,
with the door open and a pane of broken glass in it (R. 45) ·

He

also testified the nearby tool shed door was open and a snowmobile
in the area had its cover off and the cowl was open (R. 44-45).
Over objection the trial court allowed the State to
examine this witness about his further observations that day of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 -

other cabins in the area.

The trial court allowed the witness'

testimony of other alleged break-ins at Pines Ranch for the purpose
of intent, modus operendi, or general scheme or plan subject to a
motion to strike (R. 49-53).
Mr. Rogerson testified there were fresh footprints in
the snow leading to several other cabins.

He stated these other

cabins, not alleged in the Information, appeared to be burglarized
and in a general state of disaray.
The State next called Mr. Daniel Allen, previously a codefendant in the instant case (R. 99).

Mr. Allen pleaded guilty

to a lesser degree of burglary, a third degree felony (R. 99).
Sentence was pending at the time he testified in the instant case
(R. 119).

Mr. Allen testified that the appellant did not enter the

Cornwall cabin (R. 97,99,108,115) and he was unsure if the appellant
entered the adjacent tool shed (R. 106).

Mr. Allen further testi-

fied that he was the only one who attempted to start the nearby
snowmobile (R. 107).
Over the continuing objection of defense counsel (R. 99),

Mr. Allen testified he and the appellant entered some other cabins
in the area.

However, he further testified the appellant did not

remove any items from any of the cabins (R. 123).
Defense counsel's renewed motion to strike was overruled
(R. 156-159) and the evidence was received to show a plan, motive,
opportunity and absence of mistake.
- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER ALLEGED CRIMINAL ACTS
BY THE APPELLANT.
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of other
alleged criminal acts by the appellant.

The appellant further

contends the erroneous ruling is due solely to the trial court's
inability to apply the amorphous "balancing test" concept enunciate!
in Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Therefore, the appellant re-

quests this Court to adopt a more lucid formula when balancing the
probative worth and the prejudicial effect of evidence of other
crimes.
Several sound policy reasons support the adoption of a
new formula.

However, to fully evaluate this rational, it is necm

ary to view the historical development of admission of evidence of
prior criminal acts.
Traditionally, an accused's past criminal history has bee:
reviewed suspiciously by American courts.

This distrust is also

evidenced in the Utah Code Ann. §78-24-9 (1953 as amended), where
the state legislature prohibited examination concerning prior mis·
demeanor convictions.
A major reason for distrust is the fear that the trier of
fact will be prejudiced against the accused by introduction of sud~
evidence.

The result of this prejudice is manifested in several

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

ways.

First, the evidence indicates the defendant coim!litted another

unpunished crime or he is a "bad man" and should be punished regardless of his present guilt.

Second, a tendency exists to infer that,

if the defendant committed a previous crime, he probably coim!litted
the crime charged.

Recognizing these consequences, American courts

generally exclude evidence of other crimes.

State v. Scott, 111

Utah 9, 21-22, 175 P.2d 1016, 1022 (1947).
However, in some instances, evidence of other crimes is
extremely probative.

For example, in sexual offense cases, often

the criminal conduct has particular characteristics identifying the
assailant.

It is these circumstances which require the trial court

to balance the probative value of the evidence submitted against the
prejudice.
Although all jurisdictions prohibit other crimes evidence
to show a criminal propensity,

1

the approach in admitting certain

previous criminal acts varies according to the jurisdiction.

In

Utah, the legislature and this Court have adopted the inclusionary
rule.

2

This approach differs from the more traditional exclusionary rule.
1.

The major criticism against the exclusionary approach

McCormick on Evidence (Cleary) 2nd Ed. 1972 p. 447.

2. Boyce, Evidence of Other Crimes or Wron doin . 5 Utah Bar Jnl.
p. 37 (Summer
; State v. Harries,
Uta 260, 221 P.2d 605
(1950); State v. Dixon, 12 Utah Zd 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1953)! State v.
~. 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969); State v. Kasai, 27 Utah
ZdJ2"6, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972).

- 5 -
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is the rigidity of the rule itself.

It requires the party offering

evidence of other crimes to be able to pigeonhole the offer into one
3
of the specifically enumerated exceptions.
In Utah, the application of the inclusionary rule is base(
upon Rules 4S and SS, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule SS specifically

states:
Subject to Rule 4S evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified
occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to cormnit crime or civil wrong as the
basis for an inference that he cormnitted another
crime or civil wrong on another specified
occasion but, subject to Rules 4S and 48, such
evidence is admissible when relevant to rove-act inc u ing a sence o
some ot er materia
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent,
yreparation, plan knowledge or identity.
Emphasis Supplied]
Rule 45 provides:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided,
the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence
if he finds that its probative value is substantiall outwei hed b the risk that its adiriission
wil
a necessitate undue consumption o time,
Qr""Tb) create substantial dan er of undue re·udice or o con using t e issues or o mis ea ing
the"°jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise
a party who has not had reasonable opportunity
to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Thus the current application of Rule 5S, Utah Rules of
Evidence is an inclusionary rule based primarily upon the relevancy
of the evidence offered and the discretion of the trial court as
stated in Rule 4S.
3.

Ibid. Boyce p. 33-34.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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However, adoption of the generally preferred rule is
not without pitfalls.

Concentration on relevancy of the offered

evidence alone ignores the varying degrees of prejudice caused by
the offer.

Thus again Rule 45 comes into play by requiring a

balancing test of probative worth against prejudicial effect.
Whichever rule is applied, the "balancing test" of Rule 45 is the
appellant's only guarantee against prejudice.

The appellant

submits this amorphous standard requires greater definition by this
Court.
The problem of leaving all balancing to the discretion
of the trial court is best summarized in 70 Yale Law Journal 763,
at 769:
Whichever form of the rule is followed, the
"balancing test" becomes the chief barrier
against the use of prejudicial other crimes
evidence. The statement of this test gives
it an attractive simplicity: "probative
worth" is weighed against "tendency to
prejudice." Difficulties of aaplication may
be swe t under the car et of 11 iscretion"
oun in a
oo tria courts. Un ortunatel
the tria ju ~e must e arme wit more than
discretion an a formula to a 1 the test
correct y.
Emphasis Supp
McCormick on Evidence also cites the problem of the trial
court's discretion.

McCormick states:

Such a balancing calls for a large ~easure.of
individual judgment about.the relative ~a~ity
of imponderables. Accordin~ly, some opinions
stress the element of discretion. It should
be recognized, however, that thi~ i~ not a
discretion to depart from the principle that.
evidence of other crimes, having no substantial
relevancy except to ground the inference that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that the accused is a bad man and hence probably
committed this crime, must be excluded. The
leewa of discretion lies rather in the o~-osite
irection, empowering t e JU ge to exc u e the
other-crimes evidence, even when it has substantial independent relevancy. . .
[Emphasis
Supplied]
McCormick on Evidence (Cleary) 2nd
Ed. (1972) p.
The problem of discretion versus the mechanical operation
of Rule 55 is further complicated by the difficult concepts of
probative worth and prejudicial effect.
than logical relevance or pursuasiveness.

Probative value is more
No matter how persuasive

the evidence offered, it has no probative value if the fact it is
supposed to prove is not in issue.

Many courts have extended this

proposition to prohibit introduction of evidence on issues conceded
by the defendant or issues impossible to dispite.

4

This adds

"necessity" as an element of probative worth.
The best example of the necessity test is State v. Gillig<
92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649 (1918).

In that case the Connecticut

Supreme Court held that other crimes evidence of intent could not
be admitted in a homicide case where poisoning was unequivally
intentional.

The Court added that the State could use the prior

convictions in rebuttal if the defendant specifically placed intent
in issue, for example, by claiming accident.
The principle of necessity should have similar applicatio:
where the State's evidence is overwhelming on a disputed issue. Jn
such a case prejudice only results when the State is allowed to
4.

70 Yale Law Journal 763, at 770.
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introduce the additional evidence of other crimes.

Thus as a matter

of law this Court should dictate that the prejudicial effect of
other crimes evidence outweighs the probative value where a disputed
issue is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
As in the instant case, there was no legitimate issue of
identity.

The State's main witnesses all established the presence

of the appellant in the area of the cabins.

Thus, only the State

would benefit by the prejudice it caused in introducing other alleged
criminal activity by the appellant.
The appellant concedes this requires an early factual
determination.

However, this is the present practice in cases where

intent evidence is excluded in "unequivocally intentional" crimes.
The appellant further submits that adoption of the
"necessity test" would not substantially alter the partys' positions
at trial.

The State still has the ability to use other crimes

evidence in rebuttal, when a material issue becomes disputed.
defendant still has the onerous decision whether to testify.

The
The

defendant is still open to impeachment by his previous criminal
acts.

The appellant seeks only to change the procedure of admitting

evidence of other crimes.
In the instant case, the State was intially allowed to
introduce evidence of other crimes to show intent and modus operendi
(R. 52).

Later the Court expanded

its

decision

to

include

. . intent or plan or motive or modus operendi, nothing else"
(R

57).

Still later, during defense counsel's motion to strike

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the evidence was allowed "to show commonality of a plan, the
absence of mistake . . . motive, opportunity .

intent" (R. 158).

Thus what started as evidence of intent and modus operendi
ended by including opportunity, motive, absence of mistake, and a
general plan.

This is indicative of the confusion surrounding

admissibility of evidence of other crimes.

The result in this case

was the trial court accepted all the evidence of other crimes and
pigeonholed the evidence into Rule 55.

The appellant submits the

proper approach would evaluate the necessity of such evidence and
limit its introduction to those issues genuinely in dispute.

CONCLUSION
The underlying principal throughout appellant's brief is
a sincere attempt to safeguard an accused from the character smear
thzit results from evidence of other crimes.
is overwhelming.

~:c

prejudicial effoct

Prosecuting attorneys are aware of the pragmatic

effects of introducing such evidence.

The appellant seeks only to

require the State to use its best and most direct evidence before
introducing the explosive evidence of other criminal acts.

Adoption1

and application of the "necessity test" will insure this result.
Since this type of prejudicial evidence was admitted in the appellan1
trial, the conviction should be set aside and the case remanded for i
I
a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

BRAD RICH

Attorney for Appellant
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